Patent Invalidity and the Seventh
Amendment: Is the Jury Out?*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of juries in deciding patent suits has grown dramatically in
recent times. In the late 1960s to early 1970s, juries decided patent
disputes in less than ten percent of cases. 1 By contrast, in the 1990s,
the percentage of patent jury trials now exceeds fifty percent. 2 Many
observers believe that the increase in patent cases tried before juries is
related to the increase in verdict awards from patent litigation. 3 Not
surprisingly, the effect of jury outcomes in patent disputes is a hotly
debated issue among the business community, academics, and practitioners. Emerging from the debate are charges of jury bias 4 and jury
difficulty in understanding complex patent and high technology law. 5
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suggestions. This Comment is dedicated to Benetta Buell-Wilson, Robert Wilson and
Florence Wilson for their support and encouragement of a second career in law.
I. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 336
n.30 (1971) (reporting that 13 of 382 patent suits were decided by juries in the period
1968-1970).
2. See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (percentage
of jury trials was about 60% from 1992-1994 and reached 70% in 1994).
3. Stephen B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg, Jury Trials, 397 PLIIPAT 173, 173
(1994); see also Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Jury Awards
in Patent Suits, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: PAT. 11 (1995) [hereinafter Swabb].
4. Lay juries may be inherently biased towards the patentee because they hold the
U.S. Patent Office in high regard. Swabb, supra note 3, at 176. Jury bias may also be
evident in the preference of awards to independent inventors challenging large
corporations or foreign corporations. Id. See also Daniel Akst, The Cutting Edge:

Computing/Technology/Innovation INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES Patent Suit Jury
Trials are the Rage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at 8.
5. Juries may be too easily swayed by tangential issues because they are unable
to properly understand the complex technologies of today's patents. See Swabb, supra
note 3, at 177; see also Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate
Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 623 n.4 (1996);
Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994).
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In light of such concerns, many practitioners advocate reducing or
abolishing the role of juries in patent cases. 6
The role of the jury in patent trials has remained unclear after a series
of recent court decisions. The constitutional question at issue in these
decisions was whether the Seventh Amendment barred the elimination
of juries from deciding specific issues in patent cases. The actions
challenging the Seventh Amendment involve: (1) patent claims, (2) the
doctrine of equivalents, and (3) patent invalidity.
Concerning the issue of patent claims, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), sitting en bane, brushed aside
concerns about Seventh Amendment rights in Markman v. Westview
Instruments Inc. 7 when it precluded juries from deciding the interpretation and scope of patent claims, the portion of the patent that expressly
defines the metes and bounds of a patentee's property interest in an
invention.
For the doctrine of equivalents, 8 the Federal Circuit in Hilton-Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkensen Co.,9 again sitting en bane, by a
narrow margin upheld the doctrine and the right under the Seventh
Amendment to have a jury apply the doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, reversed and remanded Hilton-Davis without discussing the
Seventh Amendment issue because the court deemed it unnecessary to
decide the case. 10
Finally, patent invalidity is a defense commonly raised in actions for
patent infringement when the defending alleged infringer asserts the
patent either is invalid or he or she is not liable for infringement. 11
The right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment for the question of
patent invalidity is a hotly contested issue within the Federal Circuit that

6. See, e.g., Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994);
Kenneth R. Adamo, Reforming Jury Practice in Patent Cases: Suggestions Towards
Leaming to Love Using an Eighteenth Century System While Approaching the Twenty
First Century, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 345 (1996).
7. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd,
116 S.Ct. 1834 (1996).
8. The doctrine of equivalents is a critical area of patent infringement litigation.
Under the doctrine, a patentee attempts to expand the literal scope of the patent claims
to include "equivalents" of the claimed invention. See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (1997).
9. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkensen Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Federal Circuit in a narrow 7 to 6 ruling upheld the right of jury trial to
patent infringement suit for evaluating the doctrine of equivalents).
10. Wamer-Jenkensen Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 117 S.Ct. 1040, 1053 n.8
(1997). A unanimous court appeared to favor the jury role although it did not directly
address the issue ("Nothing in our recent Markman decision necessitates a different
result than that reached by the Federal Circuit."). Id.
11. See infra Part II.A.
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has yet to be resolved by the court en bane. The Federal Circuit in
panel decisions recently faced the Seventh Amendment question of
patent invalidity in In re Lockwood12 and in In re SGS-Thomson
Microelectronics Inc., 13 which was decided based on the court's
holding in Lockwood. 14 In both· cases, a district court denied the
plaintiff's demand to have a jury decide the patent invalidity claim, and
in both cases the Federal Circuit granted the plaintiff's request for a writ
of mandamus to have a jury try the invalidity claim. Also, in both
cases, the Federal Circuit declined a request by the defendant for an en
bane suggestion to rehear the writ. 15
In Lockwood, three members of the Federal Circuit, led by Circuit
Judge Nies, filed a vigorous dissent that attacked the panel's decision on
its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. 16 The defendant in
Lockwood sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court,
without explanation, vacated the Federal Circuit's decision granting the
writ of mandamus to Lockwood and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to proceed. 17
After vacating the decision in Lockwood, the Supreme Court denied
a petition for writ of certiorari by the ddefendant in SGS-Thomson,
appealing from the Federal Circuit decision to grant a writ of mandamus
for a jury trial to hear the patent invalidity action. 18 The denial of
request for certiorari may indicate the Supreme Court's satisfaction with
the Federal Circuit's apparent majority view favoring the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in patent invalidity actions. The
Supreme Court's order to vacate the decision in Lockwood necessarily
eliminates the precedential value of a jury trial right for patent invalidity,

12. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see infra Part III for additional
details of the case.
13. In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 60 F.3d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See infra
Part III for additional details of the case.
14. SGS-Thomson, 60 F.3d at 839.
15. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 981; In re SGS-Thomson, 60 F.3d at 862.
16. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 981 (Nies J., dissenting); see also infra note 23.
17. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). See also infra
note 58 and accompanying text, which suggest that the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment because Lockwood withdrew his demand for a jury trial.
18. International Rectifier v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 116 S. Ct. 336
(1995) (denying certiorari).
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provided by the Federal Circuit's decisions in Lockwood and in SGSThomson.19
Thus, the issue of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in
patent invalidity actions remains unsettled and continues to raise
confusion at the district court level. 20 With public pressure rising
against jury verdicts, the split in the Federal Circuit and the silence of
the Supreme Court on the Seventh Amendment right in patent invalidity
actions will continue to fuel the public concern about this important
constitutional issue.
This Comment examines the constitutional issues surrounding the
Seventh Amendment right to. a jury trial on the subject of patent
invalidity. Part II of the Comment presents background information
about patent validity, infringement, and declaratory relief actions
necessary to fully appreciate the procedural issues in patent actions that
affect a Seventh Amendment analysis. Part III presents a detailed
discussion of the procedural issues in Lockwood and in SGS-Thomson
vis-a-vis patent rights in jury trials. Parts IV and V analyze the Seventh
Amendment issues raised in Judge Nies's. dissent in Lockwood. 21
Specifically, Part IV evaluates· the Seventh aAmendment historical test
and applies it to a declaratory judgement of patent invalidity. Part V
discusses a jury trial right to patent invalidity in view of two known
exceptions to the Seventh Amendment: the public rights exception and
the matter of law exception. Finally, this Comment concludes that an
action for patent invalidity should not be afforded a jury trial right under
the Seventh Amendment because the action is arguably equitable rather

19. Decisions that have been .vacated and remanded for further proceedings
normally carry no precedential value. See County of Los Angles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625,
634 n.6 (1979) (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563, 578 n.12 ("Of necessity
our decision 'vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's
opinion of precedential effect .... "')); Fleet Aerospace v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720,
722 (1988); but see William N. Hulsey III et al., Recent Developments in Patent Law,
4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 99, 114 (1995) (suggesting the Supreme Court order to vacate
the Lockwood judgement might constitute an implicit reversal of the Federal Circuit's
judgment).
20. See Hoechst Marion Roussel v. Par Pharmaceutical, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1363, 1367 (D.N.J. 1996) (unpublished opinion; in granting certification for appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the court reasoned that "a controlling question of law exists over
whether a jury trial is available on issues of noninfringement and invalidity.").
21. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 at 981 (Nies J., dissenting). The dissent asserted
that (1) patents are public rights and as such, are exempted from the Seventh
Amendment; (2) the historical test conclusion that a declaratory judgement action to
invalidate a patent is the flipside of a common law infringement action; and (3) policy
reasons dictate that the issue of patent invalidity be a matter of law necessitating the
judge rather than the jury determine the underlying fact issues. Id.
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than legal in nature, and the question of patent invalidity should be
considered a pure matter of law reserved solely for the court.
II.

Background

To fully appreciate the Seventh Amendment issues surrounding patent
invalidity actions, a basic understanding of patent infringement is
required. Accordingly, a discussion of patent invalidity and declaratory
judgment follows.
A.

Patent Invalidity

The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, provides the federal government
with the authority to enact patent laws. 22 Congress has passed many
such laws which are now codified under Title 35 of the U.S. Code.
Under the patent laws, the government grants a patent for an invention
meeting the requirements of patentability as specified in the statutes. 23
The patent grant allows exclusive use of the patented invention by
patentees or their assigns for a limited period of time in exchange for
disclosing the invention in full to the public. The patent laws also
protect established patent rights by specifying infringing activities and
remedies available in the courts. 24
Traditionally, a patentee sued an alleged infringer for infringement of
the patent and requested damages or equitable relief. The alleged
infringer could raise any of four major defenses to the infringement
claim, including patent invalidity. 25 The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("Patent Office") issues a patent when a patent application meets
three major statutory requirements. First, an invention must fit into one
of the statutory classes of subject matter allowed for a patent and have
utility. 26 Second, the invention must be novel27 and it must not be

22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. 35 u.s.c. §§ 100-135 (1988).
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-296 (1988).
25. The other defenses are inequitable conduct or fraudulent procurement, which
renders a patent unenforceable, misuse or violation of anti-trust laws, and laches or
estoppel resulting from delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 8, § 19.01.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Whoever invents or discovers auy new aud useful
process, machine, mauufacture, or composition of matter, or·an new useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.").
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obvious. 28 Finally, the patent application must fully describe the
invention (description requirement) so that others can make and use it
(the enablement requirement); set out the best mode known to the
inventor for carrying out the invention; and have a claim that clearly sets
out the metes and bounds of the patented invention. 29
Patents issued by the Patent Office carry a statutory presumption of
validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that attaches separately to each claim of
the patent. 30 However, the effect of the presumption is not conclusive
and a patent's validity can be challenged in the courts. 31 To overcome
the presumption of validity, a patent challenger is required in most
instances to provide clear and convincing evidence of patent invalidity,
a higher standard of proof than in other civil actions. 32

27. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (section 102 sets out seven situations that would negate
a patent based on lack of novelty.).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Section 103 provides that although an invention may
be novel under § 102 of the title, a patent may not be obtained
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Section 112 provides that the specification (i.e. the
patent application)
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to carry . . . out his invention. The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.
Id.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). While more recent statutory support is provided by
section 282, the defense of patent invalidity has been around for a very long time. See
In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). It provides in pertinent part that:
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded:
1) Noninfringement, absence ofliability for infringement or unenforceability,
2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in
part II of this title as a condition for patentability,
3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirements of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
See also Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, 848 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Under § 282, a patent's validity can be challenged on numerous grounds. See, e.g.,
Gordon T. Arnold, Developing Evidence on Patent Validity Issues 424 PLI/PAT 9 (1995)
(discussing patent validity evidence relating to prior art and best mode).
32. North Am. Vaccine v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1993) ("a patent is presumed valid, and at trial [the plaintiff] had the burden of proving
facts by clear and convincing evidence showing that the patent is invalid"); but see
Manufacturing Research Corp. v. Graybar Blee. Co., 679 F.2d 1355 (reversing finding
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Although the courts acknowledge a public interest in eliminating
invalid patents, 33 an invalid patent may not be challenged in the court
on this ground alone. 34 Patent validity may be challenged in federal
court, however, if raised as a defense to infringement or some other
claim involving the patent. 35 Alternatively, validity may be counterclaimed in response to a claim for infringement or raised as an entirely
separate claim for declaratory judgment.
B.

Declaratory Judgment

Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.36 The act
authorizes the federal courts to settle the rights and obligations of parties
to a dispute that has not yet ripened. 37
In the patent field, declaratory judgment actions arise mainly from two
situations. 38 In one situation, invalidity may be charged by a manufacturer producing a product that potentially infringes another's patent. In
the second situation, a licensee may assert invalidity as a defense to a
licensing dispute. 39

of patent validity for failure to instruct jury on preponderance of evidence standard when
patent issued without consideration of the relevant prior art).
33. Blonder Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (emphasizing
the importance of the public in resolving the question of patent validity).
34. As the validity of a patent under the patent statute involves a federal question,
one does not have standing to challenge an invalid patent without a case or controversy.
See, e.g., Foster v. Halko Mfg., 947 F.2d 469, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The basis for
maintaining a declaratory judgment for invalidity rests on the existence of a 'case of
actual controversy,' cognizable in federal court.").
35. Although invalidity is raised most often as part of an action to patent
infringement, this defense can also be raised in a variety of other actions involving
patents, including priority of invention under § 102(g) of the patent statute and patent
licensing disputes. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co.,
973 F.3d 911 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding infringement claim not required to resolve 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) priority issue between parties); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 508
U.S. 83 (1967) (regarding a patent licensing dispute).
36. Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994)).
37. See generally 6A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
R57 (2nd ed. 1996).
38. For a discussion of declaratory judgment in the licensee-patentee dispute, see
Neil M. Goodman, Patent License Standing and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 83
'COLUM. L. REV. 186 (1983).
39. Id
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Declaratory judgment is particularly useful to a potential infringer
because prior to the Declaratory Judgments Act, a manufacturer was not
able to test his or her rights and potential liabilities in court until the
patentee decided to bring suit. Thus, a potential infringer was at great
disadvantage because the patentee could wait to sue when significant
damages had accrued to the manufacturer. 40
To bring an action for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, a
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an actual case or controversy
according to Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 41 A case or controversy may exist for declaratory judgment without the manufacturer
actually having infringed a patent. 42 The courts have devised a twopart test to determine if a controversy exists to sustain a declaratory
judgment action. 43 First, the declaratory judgment plaintiff must have
a reasonable suspicion that his/her activities will be considered infringing
and result in a lawsuit. Second, the plaintiff must also show that he/she
is engaged in, or has the ability to engage in, such infringing acts. 44
Thus, the flexibility of the case or controversy threshold standard for
justiciability of patent validity under a declaratory judgment action
provides a powerful weapon to the potential infringing manufacturer.
The value of the declaratory judgment, which enables a potential
infringer to test the scope and validity of a patent prior to making

40. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic [delaying suit] were
rendered helpless ...."); see also Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual Property Protection
or Protectionism? Declaratory Judgement Use by Patent Owners Against Prospective
In/ringers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 252 nn.70-72 (1992) [hereinafter Sung].
41. The statutory language of the Declaratory Judgments Act "case of actual
controversy," 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988) is interpreted by the Supreme Court as
essentially the same as the case or controversy clause of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) ("The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests." (citations omitted)); see also Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947
F.2d 469, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that without a claim of infringement "no suit
under the Declaratory Judgment Act could be maintained because, as the Supreme Court
has said, the Declaratory Judgment Act gives no independent ·basis for subject matter
jurisdiction in district court") (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667, 671 (1950)). Although a private individual in the absence of a claim or controversy
has no standing to challenge the validity of a patent in the courts, anyone, including the
patentee or his or her assigns, may request the U.S. Patent Office to reexamine the
validity of a patent based on prior art generally not considered when the patent first
issued. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988) (Request for Reexamination).
·
42. See, e.g., Sung, supra note 40, at 12.
43. Id. at 11.
44. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d at 479; see also Sung, supra note 40,
at 252-56 nn.74-94.
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significant investments, easily explains why declaratory judgments are
now routinely used in federal courts. 45
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN LOCKWOOD AND IN
SGS-THOMSON

The case of In re Lockwood arose when the patentee (Lockwood) sued
American Airlines for infringement of Lockwood's patents covering selfservice terminals and automatic dispensing systems. 46 Lockwood
sought damages and injunctive relief, and filed a timely request for jury
trial. 47 American Airlines raised several defenses including patent
invalidity; the company also counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of
noninfringement and, alternatively, that the Lockwood patents either
were invalid or unenforceable. 48
After discovery, American moved for summary judgment based on
noninfringement of the Lockwood claims. The district court granted the
motion, dismissed Lockwood's infringement claim, and denied
Lockwood an interlocutory appeal from the judgment. The district court
(in the absence of a jury) then proceeded to hear American's counterclaim for patent invalidity based on a recent Supreme Court decision49
holding that infringement and declaratory judgment actions are both to
be heard in the same trial.
Lockwood subsequently filed a motion to obtain a jury trial in the
invalidity action. The district court denied the motion because it
considered the remaining claims equitable in nature. 50 Lockwood
petitioned the Federal Circuit under a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to reinstate his jury demand. 51 A three-judge panel of the

45. See Donald L. Doemberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Question
Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529,532 n.15
(1989).
46. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (1995).
47. Id. at 968.
48. Id.
49. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (holding that the
Federal Circuit must review patent validity even when no basis for infringement is
found).
50. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968-69.
51. Id.
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Federal Circuit granted the writ, providing grounds for the constitutional
standoff with Judge Nies's dissent. 52
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to American Airlines and
vacated the Federal Circuit decision without comment. 53 The Court's
decision to vacate the Federal Circuit judgement most likely stemmed
from Lockwood's withdrawal of his demand for a jury trial, 54 which
would render a decision on the issue of a jury trial moot and, therefore,
not justiciable in federal court.
A petition for writ of mandamus for a jury trial also arose in In re
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 55 although the procedural action
in that case differed from that in Lockwood. In SGS-Thomson,
International Rectifier Corp. (IRC) sued SGS-Thomson Microelectronics
Inc. (SGS-Thomson) for patent infringement. IRC, instead of seeking
money damages in its complaint, sought only the equitable remedy of
injunctive relief. 56 SGS-Thomson asserted its defenses and counterclaimed for declaratory judgments of noninfringment, invalidity, and
unenforceability. The declaratory judgment plaintiff, SGS- Thomson,
demanded a jury trial on the counterclaims, which IRC moved to strike.
The district court denied the motion for a jury trial and SGS-Thomson,
like Lockwood, filed a request for mandamus to the Federal Circuit. A
three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit heard the case and decided to
grant the writ for the jury trial. 57 IRC's argument did not persuade the
Federal Circuit panel that a jury trial right is controlled by whether the
patentee sues first on equitable or legal claims. The court granted the
mandamus based on the decision in Lockwood and on the Supreme
Court's holding in Dairy Queen v. Wood. 58

52. The mandamus was first issued by the Federal Circuit under the reasoning that
damages and defenses of the infringement action still remained. This reasoning was later
abandoned after the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing to American. Id. at 969 ("We
no longer rely on the misstatements of our previous order."). Judge Nies dissented with
Judges Plager and Archer in response to a denial for a rehearing en bane of the
mandamus writ. Id. at 980.
53. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
54. Petitioner's Brief, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995)
(No. 94-1660); Respondent's Reply Brief, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S.
Ct. 29 (1995) (No. 94-1660).
55. 60 F.3d 839, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 839.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 840 (following the Lockwood court, which based its decision on the
"legal nature of the declaratory judgment action, not the nature of the patentee's claim").
The Federal Circuit in SGS-Thomson refused, however, to grant SGS-Thomson's request
for a jury trial on the equitable count of patent unenforceability (i.e. inequitable conduct
on the Patent Office). Id. (citing Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962)
("claims that are legal in nature and thus entitle the parties to a trial by jury may not be
treated as subservient to a claim for an injunction so as to deprive a party of its right to
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As in Lockwood, Judge Nies in SGS-Thomson dissented to the denial
of an en bane rehearing. 59 The Supreme Court finally denied certiorari
to hear IRC's demand regarding the jury trial mandamus. 60
Several issues are raised by the Federal Circuit majority and en bane
rehearing dissents in Lockwood and in SGS-Thomson, concerning a right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. First, does the Seventh
Amendment guarantee a right to a jury for a claim of patent invalidity
when the only dispute between the parties is equitable in nature, as in
SGS-Thomson? Second, is patent invalidity historically an equitable
rather than a legal claim, thus falling outside the protection of the
Seventh Amendment? Third, is the limited monopoly that arises from
a patent a public right that should require exemption from the Seventh
Amendment? Finally, is patent validity a matter of law to be decided
solely by the court? These questions are addressed below in Sections IV
and V. This Comment concludes that a Seventh Amendment right
should not attach to an action for patent invalidity because the action is
more equitable than legal in nature and because the action is a pure
matter of law.
IV.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND APPLICATION TO
PATENT RIGHTS

A.

Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence

Although the right to a jury in civil trials had been discussed at the
Constitutional Convention, the original articles of the U.S. Constitution
enacted in 1787 failed to include a provision preserving this right. 61
However, popular sentiment for preserving a jury right in civil actions
prompted the first Congress to pass an amendment to the Constitution,
ratified as the Seventh Amendment with the Bill of Rights in 1791.

a jury on the issues involved in the legal claims")).
59. In re SGS-Thomson, 61 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
60. International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 116 S.Ct.
336 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 n.2, 342 nn.6, 7
(1979) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (providing a short history of the Seventh Amendment);
Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines": An
Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J., 599,
604-11 [hereinafter Schwartz].
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The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a trial by jury in
"[s]uits at common law." 62 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
reference to common law in the Seventh Amendment as the English
common law as it existed in 1791. 63 This interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment necessarily requires a historical inquiry into English
common law actions of 1791 to resolve a question of Seventh Amendment applicability. The courts later expanded the interpretation to
include any action_that is analogous to "[s]uits at common law" in 1791,
excluding actions that would have been tried in courts of equity or
admiralty. 64 The courts further broadened the Seventh Amendment to
apply to new statutory causes of action unknown in 1791, provided the
statute creates "legal rights and remedies" enforceable in a court of
law. 65
The right to a jury trial in civil cases historically required that a
litigant bring his or her legal claims to a court of law. 66 If a litigant,
however, had both legal and equitable claims, the equitable claims could
not be pursued in a court of law. 67 To somewhat mitigate this dilemma, the courts devised the "equitable clean-up doctrine," which allowed
a court in equity to hear equitable claims and any legal claims considered subordinate to the equitable claims. 68 The clean-up doctrine did
not provide a right to a jury for the subordinate legal claims but did
provide some relief from the wastefulness of pursuing separate claims in
separate courts. 69

62. U.S. CONST. amend. VIL The amendment provides: "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id.
63. See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("[T]o ascertain the
scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate
rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional
provision in 1791." (citations omitted)); John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and
Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine in the Guise of Inseparability
and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 639 nn.71-72 [hereinafter
Sanchez].
64. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (citing Parson v. Bedford, 2
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 436-37 (1830)); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to
actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary
courts of law.").
66. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.13 (3d ed.
1996).
67. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 63, at 641 n.83.
68. Id. at 641 nn.85-86.
69. Id.
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After the merger of equity and law in the 1930s,70 the question of
whether an action involved primarily equitable or legal issues and
required a right to a jury trial became more complex. In many federal
courts, the right to a jury turned on whether the "basic nature of the
claim" as a whole was equitable or legal. 71 If the claim was basically
legal in nature, all legal issues would be heard first by a jury and the
equitable issues would follow later. 72 However, if the nature of the
claim was mainly equitable, the court could apply the equitable clean-up
doctrine and review both equitable and any legal issues considered
incidental to equitable claims in the absence of a jury. Thus, in the
post-merger period, the right to a jury trial was often lost if the legal
claims were considered incidental to the overall equitable action. 73
The Supreme Court, in Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 74 essentially eliminated the equitable clean-up doctrine. Beacon Theatres required
that, in virtually all cases involving both equitable and legal claims, if
a jury is requested for the legal claims, then all issues common to both
the legal and equitable claims must be tried first to a jury. 75 Thus,
after Beacon Theatres, inquiry into the nature of the issues rather than
the nature of the claims controlled the jury trial question. Shortly after
Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court, in Dairy Queen v. Wood, extended
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury for legal issues that previously
would have been considered incidental to the equitable issues in the
case. 76
The decision upholding a jury trial right in Beacon Theatres, which
involved a declaratory judgement action, indicates that the right to a jury
trial is not lost when the claim is set forth in the form of a declaratory

70. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a), which provides that a plaintiff
"may join either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable,
or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party."
71. See Sanchez, supra note 63, at 642 nn.90-93 and accompanying text; see also
9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2312 n.11 (1993).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
15. Id. at 504.
76. Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962) ("It would make no
difference if the equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal cause so that the basic
issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved
the jury rights it creates control.").
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judgment. 77 Declaratory judgment, being an action unknown at
common law, is considered sui generis, having neither a legal nor
equitable character of its own. 78 A declaratory judgment thus is viewed
as either legal or equitable based on the nature of the underlying
action. 79 The procedural step of filing a declaratory judgment for an
equitable action prior to filing legal counterclaims does not eliminate the
Seventh Amendment right to have a jury decide the legal claims. 80
B.

Jury Trial Rights as Determined Under the Seventh Amendment
Historical Test

Having provided in Beacon Theatres and in Dairy Queen that the
Seventh Amendment required the right to have a jury hear the legal
issues prior to the equitable issues, the next and more difficult question
for the Supreme Court involved whether a particular issue was legal
within the meaning of "[s]uits at common law" under the Seventh
Amendment. 81 In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court described three
factors for determining if an issue is legal or equitable in nature. 82
First, whether the cause of action is analogous to actions at law or equity
prior to merger of the two courts; second, the nature of the remedy as
legal or equitable; and third, the "practical abilities and limitations of
juries" in hearing the issue. 83 The first and second Ross factors later

77. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504 (holding that a defendant who
counterclaims for damages cannot be deprived of the right to a jury because the plaintiff
sued first for declaratory relief under an equitable cause of action).
78. See, e.g., EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS 26-28, 239 (2d ed.
1941) (stating an action for "declaratory relief is Sui generis and is as much legal as
equitable"); Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) ("The fact that the action is in
form a declaratory judgment case should not obscure the essentially legal nature of the
action.").
79. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Because the
declaratory judgment action is itself neither legal nor equitable, the historical inquiry
required by the Seventh Amendment takes as its object the nature of the underlying
controversy."). Judge Nies's dissent in Lockwood took no issue with the majority view
that a declaratory judgment is as equitable or as legal as the underlying claims. Id. at
981.
80. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504.
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
82. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
83. Id. The third Ross factor dealing with "practical abilities and limitations of
juries" raises the issue that a court may potentially deny the Seventh Amendment right
if the legal issues were too complex for the average juror to handle. Id. The Supreme
Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood, which involved an accounting for profits in a contract
and Trademark infringement dispute, considered whether the legal issues were beyond
the jury's ability. 369 U.S. 469, 479 n.17 (1962). The Court decided that the case was
not too complex and that a special master, under rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was an option for the court to help the jury with complex legal issues. Id.
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became what is known as the Seventh Amendment historical test. 84
The Supreme Court first applied the Seventh Amendment historical
test in Curtis v. Loether, 85 an action arising under section 812 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Section 812 authorizes private plaintiffs to
redress violations of Title VIII, the fair housing provision of the Civil
Rights Act. In applying the Seventh Amendment historical test, the
Curtis Court held the action was legal rather than equitable because it
was analogous to a tort action (first factor) and the relief sought, actual
and punitive damages, was "the traditional form of relief offered in the
courts of law" (second factor). 86 The Court further determined that the
relief sought was a more important factor than the nature of the action
in deciding to apply the Seventh Amendment. 87
In Tull v. United States, 88 an action involving civil penalties and
injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court, using
the historical test, identified an analogous action in both law and
equity. 89 Although admitting that the equity action may have been the
better analogy, the Court held that, as long as the legal action was
appropriately analogous, the Seventh Amendment applied. 90 The Court
in Tull also reiterated the view from Curtis that the nature of the relief
sought is a more important factor than the nature of the action. The
Court concluded that the relief available under the Clean Water Act was
more typical of an action at law than at equity. 91 Thus, applying the
Seventh Amendment historical test, the Tull Court concluded that the
Seventh Amendment applied to the adjudication of rights under the
Clean Water Act. 92

at 478 n.19. In later cases, the Supreme Court seems to have played down the third
Ross factor or merged its meaning with the public rights exception to the Seventh
Amendment. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
84. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.6 (1987) ("Our search is for a single
historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of the cause of action and the
remedy as two important factors.").
85. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
86. Id. at 196.
87. Id.
88. 481 U.S. at 412.
89. Id. at 420.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 421-25 (noting that damages under the act were not limited to restoration
of the status quo).
92. Id. However, the court concluded that the assessment of penalties by a judge,
as required under the Clean Water Act, was outside the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 427.
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More recently, the Supreme Court applied the Seventh Amendment
historical test in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 93 an action involving a
Chapter 11 trustee suing in bankruptcy court to block allegedly
fraudulent transfers. 94 In Granfinanciera, the Court determined that a
claim. of fraudulent transfer could be brought in either a court of equity
or a court of law. 95 However, the Court determined that the nature of
the remedy sought, a specified sum. of money, required that the action
be brought to a court of law. 96 Thus, the Court followed the rule that
the nature of the remedy sought was more important than the analogy to
the cause of action and upheld a Seventh Amendment right to the trustee
action.
In its most recent pronouncement of the Seventh Amendment,
however, the Supreme Court obscured the two-part nature of the
historical test by ignoring any reference to the remedy sought. In
Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., the Court stated the historical
test as a determination of "whether we are dealing with a cause of action
that either was tried at law at the time of the Founding or is at least
analogous to one that was." 97 The Court's failure to acknowledge the
second factor of the historical test does not appear to be significant; no
dispute was raised about the number of prongs involved and the Court
cited its version of the test to a prior decision that used both factors. 98
The recitation of an abridged test by the Markman Court can be
explained because the issue in the case, whether the court or the jury
interprets the claims in a patent suit, has no connection with the
remedies, the second factor of the historical test. Thus, Markman
provides no real basis to argue that the Supreme Court has changed the
Seventh Amendment historical test from. that which is consistently
elaborated by the Court in prior cases.
In sum.m.ary, the Supreme Court's Seventh Am.endm.ent jurisprudence
provides a two-part historical test evaluating the cause of action and the
remedy to determine whether an issue is equitable or legal in nature.
The Court prefers the second factor, the nature of the remedy sought,
when performing the historical inquiry. 99 It has upheld a right under

93. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Id. at 46-47 nn.5, 6.
97. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1995).
98. Id. at 1389 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)).
99. See, e.g., Chauffers v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Granfinanciera, 492
U.S. at 42; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
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the Seventh Amendment in all cases when the remedy involved
monetary damages exceeding those normally provided by equity. 100
Any historical inquiry under the Seventh Amendment is necessarily
complicated by the fact that the line between law and equity was never
very clear, 101 and that actions at law in eighteenth century England
might be too "remote in form and concept that there is no firm basis for
comparison." 102 Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has
resisted any suggestions to discard or modify the two-factor inquiry. 103
Thus, an historical inquiry into patent invalidity requires evaluation of
both the cause of action and the remedy and, depending on the results,
either one or both of the inquiries must be legal in nature for the
Seventh Amendment to apply.
C.

Application of Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence to Patent
Validity

To determine whether a Seventh Amendment right applies to the
action in Lockwood, one must look to 1791 English cornrnon law for an
analogue of a declaration of patent invalidity. The search is complicated, however, by the fact that patents have long been a statutory right and
1791 English patent laws provided for the defense of invalidity in both
courts of law and courts of equity. 104 A court of law gave the patentee
the option of seeking damages, while a court of equity gave the patentee

100. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18;
Curlis, 415 U.S. at 194. As further evidence for the controlling nature of the remedy,
courts of appeal have denied the Seventh Amendment right when the remedy was
equitable in nature but the cause of action could be analogized to an action at law. See
Sanchez, supra note 63, at 648 n.126 (employment suits under Title VII can be
analogized to an action at law, but are considered equitable for Seventh Amendment
purposes because the remedies sought, including back pay and reinstatement, are
equitable in nature); see also In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies
J., dissenting) (citing circuit cases where a Seventh Amendment right was denied without
a damage claim remaining to be tried); but see Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 57071 (1990) (distinguishing back pay under Title VII from a request for back pay under
a breech of union's duty of fair representation).
101. See Chauffers, 494 U.S. at 577 (citing Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658-59 (1963)).
102. Id. at 578 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 558 (Marshall, J., majority); id. at 573 (Brennan J., concurring); id. at
584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. See Martin J. Adelman, En Banc on Claim Construction and Equivalents, 423
PLIIPAT 767, 774-78 nn.104-115 (1995) [hereinafter Adelman].
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the option of seeking an accounting of past use and an injunction against
future use. 105 Thus, a right to a jury for patent invalidity historically
depended on whether the defense had been pled in law or in equity. 106
Under the procedural facts in Lockwood, the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant, American Airlines, for lack of
infringement, leaving only a declaration of patent invalidity and
unenforceability in the case. 107 To decide whether Lockwood deserved
a right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment for patent invalidity, the
Lockwood court determined that the only satisfactory historical analogue
for a declaration of patent validity is an action for infringement at law
when patent invalidity is pled as an affirmative defense. 108 This
argument, however, fails to address the fact that the defense of patent
invalidity was also pled in equity without a jury trial. 109 More importantly, the declaration of patent invalidity in Lockwood no longer has the
character of a defense to an action at law because Lockwood's infringement claim for monetary damages was denied by the court. 110
The Lockwood court attempted to support its historical analogue by
stating that a declaration of patent invalidity is merely the inverse of an
action for infringement with the parties in reverse. 111In characterizing
patent invalidity as the inverse of a suit for infringement, the court could
properly hold that a right to a jury trial exists under Beacon Theatres v.
Westwood. 112 As stated in Judge Nies's dissent, however, a declaratory judgment of no infringement, rather than one for patent invalidity, is

105. Id. at 782.
106. Id. at 774-78 nn.104-115 (arguing the Lockwood court was wrong in stating
categorically that the defense of invalidity is a legal issue because it is legal or equitable
depending on the context of the proceeding). Cf Markman v. Westwood Instruments,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 ("there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be
tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.").
107. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
108. Id. at 974 n.9.
109. Adelman, supra note 104, at 777-78 (citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126
(1881) ("[I]t is now the constant practice of courts of equity to try without a jury issues
of fact relating to the title of the patentee, involving questions of [patent validity] ....
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to try such issues according to its own course of
practice it too well settled to be shaken.").
110. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968.
111. Id. at 975 n.10.
112. 359 U.S. 500, 504 ("[I]f Beacon would have been entitled to a jury trial ...
against Fox it cannot be deprived of that right merely because Fox took advantage of the
availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon first."); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If the declaratory judgment
action does not fit into one of the existing equitable patterns but is essentially an
inverted law suit [sic]-an action brought by one who would have been a defendant at
common law-then the parties have a right to a jury.").
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the flip side to an action for infringement. 113 The former is limited to
the particular claims of the patent that the patentee asserts are infringed,
while the latter can be asserted against any claims of the patent. 114 As
pointed out by Judge Nies, there is no flip side to a declaration of patent
invalidity; the patentee has no opportunity to sue in court to have a
patent declared valid. 115
The Supreme Court decision in Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc. 116 provides further support
that a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity is not the inverse of an
infringement action where the defense of invalidity is pled. The
Cardinal Court distinguished the action of infringement from patent
invalidity by holding that a court of appeal's finding of no infringement
does not render moot the review of declaratory judgment of patent
invalidity. 117 In making its decision, the Cardinal court distinguished
an affirmative defense of patent invalidity from a declaration of patent
invalidity. 118 Thus, although a declaration of patent invalidity is a
common defense in an infringement action, it cannot be properly
characterized as the inverse of an infringement claim when the
affirmative defense of patent invalidity is pled and, therefore, is not
subject to a jury trial right on that basis.
A better historical analogue for a declaration of patent invalidity may
be found in the English writ of scire facis, which was available in the
English Chancery court to render a patent invalid. 119 The Court of
Chancery had common law jurisdiction but had no power to summon a
jury, and would often transfer the scire facis cases to the King's Court
113. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 986 n.12 (Nies, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 986. As discussed by Judge Nies, the closest action for a patentee to
have the patent declared valid is a Request for Reexamination to the U.S. Patent Office
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988). The request is an ex parte administrative
proceeding limited generally to prior art not considered by the Patent Office during
examination of the patent application. See, e.g., Emhart Indus. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg.,
3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1890 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
116. 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
117. Id. at 96 ("[A] declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent
of the patentee's charge of infringement.").
118. Id. at 93-94 ("An unnecessary ruling on an affirmative defense is not the same
as the necessary resolution of a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.").
119. See, e.g., Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 984-85 (Nies J., dissenting); see also Adelman,
supra note 104, at 790-91 (dismissing the Lockwood panel Order's argument that a writ
of scrie f acis was limited to an action for inequitable conduct and supporting that the
writ was more analogous to an equitable action for patent invalidity that an action at
law).
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for a jury to determine any issue of material fact. 120 The jury's
findings were then returned to the Chancellor who rendered the final
decision on the patent. A jury trial of the facts under the writ of scire
facis was not a "matter of right" because the jury findings were no more
than advisory-"merely to inform the conscience of the court." 121
Thus, the lack of a true jury right urges that the English writ of scire
facis be considered equitable rather than legal in nature.
Even assuming arguendo the correctness of the Lockwood court's view
that when the affirmative defense of patent invalidity pled in an action
for patent infringement is analogous to an action at law under the
Seventh Amendment test, the second factor of the historical test, the
nature of the remedy sought, must still be addressed to decide the jury
right. The Lockwood court and Judge Nies's dissent disagreed over
whether one or both factors need to be found legal in nature for a jury
trial right to apply. The Lockwood court, not surprisingly, maintained
that only one factor need be satisfied and rested its conclusion on a
footnote in Tull. 122 The footnote, as argued in Judge Nies's dissent,
does not support, and even repudiates, the Lockwood court's position.123
Indeed, the Lockwood court misconstrues the analysis in Tull by
focusing on the rights and ignoring the second prong of the historical
test, the remedy. If one accepts the view that a declaratory judgment of

120. See Adelman, supra note 104, at 778-79 (1995).
121. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting); see Adelman, supra note 104
at 778-79, 790-91; Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.S.C. 1849). In England, the
Chancellor in equity, when in doubt about the validity of a patent, had.discretion to send
the parties to law to resolve the question. The results of the validity analysis were not
binding on the Chancellor. Id. But see Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 975 n.9 (stating that an
issue of fact for a writ of scrie f acis was determined by jury trial and, therefore, the writ
was legal in nature).
122. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (stating that a jury trial is required when "either the
adjudication of legal rights [as found in Tull] ... or, alternatively, the implementation
of legal remedies [as found in Curtis] ..." are involved) (citations omitted). As
discussed in Judge Nies's dissent, the Lockwood court based its either/or position on a
footnote in Tull. Id. at 984 n.6 (Nies, J., dissenting).
The Government contends that both the cause of action and the remedy must
be legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches.
It divides the Clean Water Act action for civil penalties into a cause of action
and a remedy, and analyzes each component as if the other were irrelevant.
Thus, the Government proposes that a public nuisance action is the better
historical analog for the cause of action, and that an action for disgorgement
is the proper analogy for the remedy. We reject this novel approach. Our
search is for a single historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of
the cause of action and the remedy as two important factors.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.6 (1987) (citation omitted).
123. Lockwood, F.3d at 984 n.6 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("A reading of the entire Tull
footnote shows·that the [Supreme] Court rejected the panel's position.").
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patent validity is an action with a right and a remedy, the only inquiry
then is the right; there is no discretion for the penalty which is complete
invalidation of the patent claim. 124 Thus, the relevant question is
whether the action and the remedy are both required to determine the
right to a declaration of patent invalidity.
The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence requires, as
discussed above, 125 that both the cause of action and remedy are
necessary factors in the historical test. Thus, Judge Nies in Lockwood
was correct in her interpretation of the footnote in Tull. 126 Judge
Nies's dissent, however, takes the categorical position that both factors
must be found legal in nature for the jury right to adhere. 127 This view
does not comport with the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence,. as already discussed. 128 The Supreme Court provides
that the right attaches when the two factors "on balance" support a jury
trial, but offers little guidance on how to achieve that balance. 129
Thus, the Seventh Amendment historical test requires that both factors
of the test be performed, but there is no absolute requirement that both
factors be found legal in nature for the right to apply. 130
The second factor in the historical test does not support a Seventh
Amendment right for a declaration of patent invalidity. The relief
sought in Lockwood, i.e. invalidation of the patent, is clearly equitable
in nature. 131 The remedy for patent invalidity is to render unenforce-

124. Because each claim of the patent is presumed valid, an action for invalidity can
be limited to all or to only individual claims. Invalidation of claims in a patent suit has
no impact on the ability of the patentee to assert the remaining valid claims. 35 U.S.C.
§ 288 (1988).
125. See supra Part IV.A.
126. A fair reading of footnote six in Tull indicates the Court viewed the cause of
action and the remedy not as separate inquiries but rather as two factors of a single
inquiry. Tull, 481 U.S. at 421.
127. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("Since the first part of the test
to determine whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial is negated by this
English equity action [scire facis], that should end the inquiry.").
128. See supra Part IV.A.
129. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989). See also supra Part IV.A.
130. In Markman, the question of who interprets the meaning of patent claims was
not an action having a right and a remedy but merely a sub-issue in a patent trial.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). In contrast, a
declaration for patent invalidity has a right and remedy like any other action and thus
is amenable to the two-part Seventh Amendment historical test.
131. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("The remedy sought in this
case is not legal and therefore, on this ground alone, no jury trial is required.").
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able any patent claim so judged and, therefore, is no different from the
equitable remedy for patent unenforceability, which renders all patent
claims unenforceable for inequitable conduct on the Patent Office. 132
The remedy for both of these actions is effectively an injunction against
the patent. 133
Prior circuit decisions have not addressed .the nature of patent
invalidity as equitable or legal, except for Shubin v. United States
District Court. 134 In Shubin, the defendant-patentee, facing a declaratory judgment for patent invalidity and non-infringement, stipulated that
no actual infringement had occurred and pled only for equitable relief.
Acknowledging that the sole disputed issue of fact in the case was the
claim for patent invalidity, the court nevertheless held against the
defendant-patentee's request for a jury trial and concluded the absence
of infringement damages left only equitable issues to be decided. 135
The decision in Shubin is consistent with Judge Nies's position that
patent invalidity is historically not a legal issue. 136 A right to a jury
for a declaration of patent invalidity should not turn merely on a
pleading for damages when such a pleading may have no basis in
fact. 137 Had the patentee in Shubin pled monetary damages, then
under Beacon Theatres v. Westover 138 the jury trial right would apply.
However, the jury right extends only to any legal issues and, therefore,
should not apply to the declaration of patent invalidity under Shubin.
The decision to grant a jury trial for patent invalidity in In re
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 139 a case decided on the holding
in Lockwood, is similar ·to Shubin in that the patentee only sought
equitable relief. The Shubin court decided against a jury trial because

132. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988); see also supra note 35.
133. But see Adelman, supra note 104, at 788 (arguing that the case or controversy
remaining in Lockwood is an action for cancellation of the Lockwood patents).
134. Shubin v. United States Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963).
135. Id. When characterizing the remaining issues as equitable in nature, the court
seemed to focus on the defendant-patentee's claim for an injunction without mentioning
the plaintiff's claim of patent invalidity. This oversight might suggest that the court did
not consider an action for patent invalidity as a significant Seventh Amendment issue.
136. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 984-87 (Nies, J., dissenting). The Lockwood court,
however, maintained that Shubin was distinguishable because the defendant could not
bring a claim for damages. 50 F.3d at 977 ("[N]o claim for damages could have been
brought."). The court fails to explain how this is any different from Lockwood, who lost
his damage claim after the trial court dismissed the infringement claim.
137. The court of appeals in Shubin upheld the district court decision to deny the
defendant-patentee's request to amend the pleadings and allege monetary damages of
infringement solely for the purpose of obtaining a jury trial. Shubin v. United States
Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d at 250.
138. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
139. 60 F.3d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
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no money damages for infringement were pied and the only action in the
case was an injunction, which is an equitable claim. 140 Shubin,
therefore, should control in SGS-Thomson where only equitable relief
and no money damages were pled. This conclusion is further supported
by the analysis above that a Seventh Amendment right should not apply
to a declaration of patent invalidity, as the historical test indicates
invalidity is an equitable rather than a legal action.
In summary, application of the Seventh Amendment historical test to
a declaration of patent invalidity demonstrates at most a legal basis for
only the least important factor, the historical analogy. Thus, "on
balance," the two factors of the historical test indicate that the Seventh
Amendment does not apply to a declaration of patent invalidity, and the
grant of mandamus for a jury trial in Lockwood and SGS-Thomson
appears in error.
The evaluation of any jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment,
however, must also consider whether exceptions to the Amendment
would negate that right. The following section of this article, Part V,
addresses the public rights exception and the matter of law exception as
they pertain to patent invalidity.
V.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND PATENT
VALIDITY

A.

The Public Rights Exception

The public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment embodies the
power of Congress to transfer actions involving public rights to a
non-Article III forum where the right to a jury is absent. 141 A "private
right" was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Granfinanciera v.
Nordberg as "the liability of one individual to another under the

140. Shubin, 313 F.2d at 250.
141. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989) ("The Seventh
Amendment protects a litigant's right to a jury trial only if a cause of action is legal in
nature and it involves a matter of 'private right."'); see also Martin H. Redish & Daniel
J. LaFave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A
Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409
(1995) ("[I]t is clear that when the dust settles, in most cases Congress possesses
ultimate authority to deny the jury trial right by transferring adjudication to a non-Article
III forum.") [hereinafter Redish & LaFave].
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law." 142 In contrast, a "public right" involves the federal government
or involves "a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into
a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." 143
In In re Lockwood, 144 Judge Nies cited to Pantlex v.
Mossinghojf 45 to assert that the Federal Circuit previously held patents
to be public rights. In Pantlex, the Federal Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the patent statute dealing with reexamination. 146 Under the
statutes, reexamination of a patent occurs in an administrative
non-Article III proceeding in the Patent Office. 147 Thus, reexamination
provides an apparent public right to invalidate a patent in the absence of
a jury trial right. 148 The constitutionality of the reexamination statutory procedure which denies a jury trial right strongly supports the view
that a patent is a public rather than a private right.
Judge Nies also argued that, because patents involve public rights, the
Lockwood court's decision providing a jury trial right for patent
invalidity conflicts with Supreme Court precedent holding that a jury
trial does not adhere to a public rights determination. 149 The public
rights argument, however, fails because it assumes that Congress or the
courts are required to remove the Seventh Amendment right from all
public rights actions.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Granfinanciera gave Congress the
discretion to take actions involving public rights away from the Seventh
Amendment by placing them in a non-Article III proceeding. 150 In the
Patent Statutes, however, Congress did not actually remove invalidity
proceedings from Article III courts, but simply established statutory
reexamination of issued patents as a parallel non-Article II proceeding

142. 492 U.S. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22, 52 (1932)).
143. Id. at 54 (citing Thomas v Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586
(1985) (Brennan J., concurring)).
144. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
145. Pantlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
146. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988).
147. For a comparison of Article III and Non-Article III courts, see Eric Grant, A
Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 144, 268 (1996).
148. See Pantlex, 758 F.2d at 604 ("In contrast with the private rights at issue in
Northern Pipeline, the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern."); see also
Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upholding
Pantlex).
149. 50 F.3d at 983.
150. 492 U.S. 33, 52 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 4 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) ("Congress 'may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper,' matters involving
public rights.")).
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rights exception does not presently exempt a Seventh Amendment jury
trial right from patent invalidity actions.
B.

Matter of Law Exception

For the majority of circumstances, where an issue is subject to a jury
trial, the judge decides questions of law pertaining to the issue while any
facts in dispute that bear upon the question are decided by the jury. 157
Thus, in principle, a pure question of law does not give rise to a Seventh
Amendment right.
The Supreme Court stated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 158 that
"[w]hile the ultimate question of patent validity is one oflaw, the § 103
condition [i.e. obviousness], ... lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries." 159 The traditional interpretation of that statement would
require that the factual inquiry of obviousness be decided by the jury if
facts were in dispute (or by the judge if the action was equitable), and
whether the facts met the legal requirement would ultimately be decided
by the trial judge. 160 Judge Nies in In re Lockwood raises the provocative question of whether there is any constitutional basis for a jury to
decide the factual issues underlying an ultimate question of law. 161
Judge Nies asserts that, as a matter of policy for "reasoned and uniform"
decisions, the courts are not precluded by the Seventh Amendment from

157. See, e.g., Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931) ("In a trial by
jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial
for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law."
(emphasis added)); Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 207, 233
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (differentiating the standard of review for issues of fact determined by
the jury or the judge versus the standard of review for legal decisions).
158. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
159. Id. at 17 (citation omitted) (citing A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)). The factual inquires that must be answered to
determine invalidity based on obviousness include "(1) the scope and content of the prior
art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the art at the time when the invention was made; and (4) objective
evidence of nonobviousness." Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 989
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18).
160. Newell Companies v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(summarizing Federal Circuit decisions regarding summary judgment motions and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for patent invalidity based on obviousness holding
that no trial right adheres unless there is a dispute in the underlying facts). However,
Federal Circuit precedent generally supports using a jury to decide a question of law in
patent invalidity. Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 989 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting). ·
161. 50 F.3d at 989-90 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("I can point to no definitive Supreme
Court pronouncement respecting a Seventh Amendment right or no right to have a jury
decide factual issues underlying an issue of law.").

1812

[VOL. 34: 1787, 1997]

Patent Invalidity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

taking the factual inquiry underlying patent invalidity from the jury if a
litigant so requests. 162
The question raised by Judge Nies was later addressed by the Supreme
Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 163 The issue in
Markman involved whether the construction of patent claims is a matter
of law "reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine" the factual disputes. 164
Such disputes often arise over the meaning of particular words used in
the patent claims. 165 The Markman Court held that construction of the
patent claims, including any factual questions bearing upon the words
used in the claims, is strictly a matter of law reserved for the court. 166
The Court decided the matter of law exception by considering two
major questions: (1) whether the statutory action in question was an
action at law; and (2) if the action is one at law, whether the trial
decision at issue is necessary to preserve the common law right of trial
by jury. 167 The Court answered the first question by using the Seventh
Amendment historical test. 168 The second question, admittedly difficult to answer, involved inquiry into: (a) 1791 English law (i.e. the
historical Seventh Amendment test); (b) existing precedent; (c) the
relative interpretive skills of judge and jury; and (d) the statutory policies
furthered by the decision. 169 This precedential analysis will be referred
to as the "Markman legal issue test."
The Markman legal issue test can be applied to the facts in In re
Lockwood to determine if, as Judge Nies asserts, the facts underlying
patent invalidity should be a matter solely for the court. The test is
formulated such that if the action or issue is determined to be equitable

162. Id. ("[A] litigant has a right to a trial court's decision with findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of validity.").
163. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
164. Id. at 1387.
165. Confusion in the meaning of terms can arise because the inventor can be his
or her own lexicographer and give special meaning to words used in the claim.
However, the term may not have a meaning repugnant to its general usage. In re Hill,
161 F.2d 367 (CCPA 1947).
166. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395.
167. Id. at 1389.
168. The formulation of the historical test differed from prior formulations in that
it lacked the second factor, the nature of the remedy sought. Id. at 1384. The court
made no mention of this discrepancy and likely ignored the remedy factor since the
action at issue, patent infringement, was indisputably an issue at law.
169. Id. at 1390, 1392 n.10.
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in nature under the historical test, there is no jury question issue. If so,
the second question-whether the action or issue is essential to preserve
the jury trial right-becomes moot. As discussed above in Part I.A., the
Seventh Amendment historical test indicates that a declaration of patent
invalidity is an equitable rather than a legal action, thus, there is no right
to a jury trial. However, if one considers patent invalidity as arguably
an action at law, then the second question of the Markman legal issue
test is addressed to determine if a jury factual inquiry is necessary to
preserve the substance of the common law right.
The second question of the Markman legal issue test also begins with
an historical inquiry, but this time the question is whether the right to
have a jury for the issue in question is "fundamental, as inherent in and
of the essence of the system of trial by jury." 17° For a declaration of
patent invalidity, it cannot be argued that a right to have a jury find the
facts in dispute is historically fundamental because under 1791 English
patent law, invalidity was a defense raised in both the courts of law and
equity. 171 The Chancellor in equity had the authority to rule on
validity but had discretion to refer the case to a jury in the common law
courts and consider the jury's conclusion only as advisory. 172
The next factor, whether the existing precedent supports the essential
right of a jury trial to patent invalidity, is again complicated by the split
between equity and law. Prior to the merger, a patentee seeking
equitable relief was required to sue in equity and had no Seventh
Amendment right to a defense of patent invalidity. 173
After the merger of law and equity, the courts continued to deny jury
trial rights for patent invalidity when the action sought was primarily
equitable. 174 After the Supreme Court decisions in Beacon Theatres
v. Westwood Inc. 175 and in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 176 it became clear
that the issues common to both legal and equitable causes must be tried
first to a jury if requested. But Shubin v. United States District
Court, 177 a case interpreted in view of Dairy Queen, held that no

170. Id. at 1390 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426).
171. See Adelman, supra note 104.
172. See id. See also supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
173. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1881) ("[l]t is now the constant
practice of courts of equity to try without a jury issues of fact relating to the title of the
patentee, involving questions of [patent validity] . . . . The jurisdiction of a court in
equity to try such issues according to its own course of practice it too well settled to be
shaken.").
174. See also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
175. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
176. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
177. Shubin v. United States Dist. Ct., 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963). But see In re
Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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Seventh Amendment right applied to an action for a declaration of patent
invalidity in the absence of a standing claim for damages. Thus,
although the most recent precedent seems to require that patent invalidity
is an action where the Seventh Amendment applies, the weight of
authority does not support the view that a declaration of patent invalidity
is fundamental to the system of trial by jury.
The relative interpretive skills of judge andjury were key factors in
the decision by the Supreme Court in Markman to take the responsibility
of claim interpretation from the jury. 178 Judge Nies and others continue to assert that juries are not competent for trying patent issues. 179
The Markman Court appreciated the need for expert testimony to enable
proper construction of patent claims in the context of the patent
document, and the Court concluded that credibility judgments of
competing experts-a duty best handled by the jury-was less important
in this instance than the ability to evaluate the testimony of the experts
in association with the patent document. 180
The difficulty faced by juries interpreting a patent and its supporting
documents for claim construction also applies to patent invalidity. For
example, one must understand the differences between the invention and
the prior art to determine if the invention as a whole is obvious. This
analysis requires careful consideration of expert testimony and analysis
of the art in question. Thus, a strong case can be made that a judge,
typically well-educated and experienced in document analysis, is better
equipped than a jury to find the facts underlying patent invalidity.
The final factor in the Markman legal issue test, the statutory policies
furthered, was also important to the decision in that case. The Court
determined that a policy for uniformity in patents was an important
public issue and that this policy would be ill-served if construction of
patents and claims were left to'juries. 181 The Court reasoned that the
singular nature of the Federal Circuit as the sole patent appeals court
promotes, in theory, some degree of intra-jurisdictional uniformity by
stare decisis. 182 This logic, however, applies to any questions of law
and would therefore apply to patent invalidity as well.
178. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996).
179. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 996, 990 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text; Adelman, supra note 104, at 795.
180. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
181. Id. at 1396.
182. Id.
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In summary, application of the Markman legal issue test, on balance,
supports a conclusion that the question of patent invalidity should be
considered solely a matter of law, where the facts at issue and the
application of the facts to the law are a matter entirely reserved for the
court.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The quest to establish more uniformity and predictability in patent
decisions by eliminating juries from the decision making process raises
the issue whether the Seventh Amendment stands in the way of
eliminating juries from patent invalidity actions. Under Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence, patent invalidity is arguably more equitable
than legal and, therefore, a right to a jury should not attach. Also, under
the Markman legal issue test, patent invalidity is, on balance, not
essential to the common law right of trial by jury in patent actions. The
public policy for uniformity in patent law supports finding patent
invalidity as a matter of law, reserved entirely for the trial court.
Finally, by virtue of the fact that patents are public rights, Congress has
the power to remove all patent invalidity determinations to the Patent
Office with Federal Circuit review. As the positions in this Comment
are probably in the minority in the Federal Circuit, patent invalidity will
continue to command a Seventh Amendment right in the foreseeable
future, unless the Supreme Court or Congress intervenes on behalf of
social policy considerations.
BARRY S. WILSON
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